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provided that this copyright notice appear on all such copies.While the functions of coupons have been widely studied, few researchers have attempted
to model the factors that influence the face values of coupons.  Reasons for this void include a
lack of detailed transactions data and the fact that coupon information is proprietary.  Since no
study comprehensively analyzes the determinants of coupon values, the literature does not provide
insight to firm managers as to what these significant factors may be.  Understanding the
determinants of discount levels is becoming increasingly important for firms.  There is concern
that discounts have risen above their optimal values, and large companies such as General Mills
and Proctor & Gamble have slashed promotional budgets.  Knowing what variables influence
coupon values will aid managers in determining optimal discount levels and help prevent wasteful
overspending on promotional programs.
The objective of this study is to fill the gap in the literature by formulating and testing a
model that identifies the significant determinants of coupon values at the brand level.  The
theoretical framework is based on three streams in the literature: profit maximization theory,
address models, and hedonic pricing studies.  Furthermore, the empirical model is estimated with
reliable grocery scanner data on ready-to-eat (RTE) breakfast cereal purchases.
This study should be of interest for two reasons.  First, couponing is big business.  Cereal
manufacturers print billions of coupons annually, and almost one-third of the volume of cereal is
purchased with coupons.  Since the late 1980s, trade promotion expenditures by cereal
manufacturers have exceeded expenditures for mass-media advertising (Connor 1999).   Second,
understanding how coupon values are determined is important for analyzing consumer welfare
issues.  Cereal manufacturers appear to have extensive unilateral market power and engage in
tacit collusion to set supra-competitive prices (Cotterill 1996).  Firms put forth great effort to
maintain brand value and create barriers to entry through advertising, promotion, productdifferentiation, product proliferation, and variation (Kahn 1996).  Coupons are issued to price
discriminate, extract consumer surplus, maximize profit, and get the most out of high brand
prices.  If consumers in this industry are to be protected, antitrust economists must understand the
negative impacts of cereal coupons.
In the only study that explicitly models coupon values, Gerstner, Hess, and Holthausen
(1994) derived a profit function for a price-discriminating monopolist that issues coupons to
consumers who vary in their willingness to pay and level of transactions costs.  The optimal brand
coupon value was found by differentiating the profit function with respect to the discount, setting
the first-order condition equal to zero, and solving for the coupon value.  The empirical model
specifies brand coupon values as a function of the markup margin, retail brand price, and a new
product dummy variable.  Gerstner, Hess, and Holthausen (1994) estimated the model with
grocery coupons that were clipped from newspapers across the country.  The variables were
found to be statistically significant.  The hypotheses that coupon values rise with higher retail
prices and decrease with an increasing percentage retail margin are supported.  In addition, the
results indicate that larger face values are associated with new products.
Shaffer and Zhang (1995) investigated target couponing as a firm strategy.  Using an
address model, they argued that coupon issuance can be an offensive or defensive strategy. 
Offering discounts can increase a firm’s sales by stealing away rival firms’ price sensitive
consumers.  However, coupons may also be used to defend a firm’s market share when its
customers are targeted.  Firms engage in more defensive couponing when the intensity of
competitive targeting increases.  Shafer and Zhang (1995) also noted that the discount level for a
given brand is inversely related to the consumers’ loyalty to that good.
Stanley and Tschirhart (1991) estimated the implicit prices of breakfast cerealcharacteristics using a hedonic pricing model.  Product attributes were assumed to provide one or
more of the following services to consumers: taste, nutrition, and convenience.  The
characteristics considered in the study were vitamin, sugar, fiber, sodium, and preservative levels;
texture, grain type, whether a given brand contained fruit, and if the product was natural.  A linear
Box-Cox model was estimated with information collected from cereal boxes.  The results indicate
that individuals pay more for brands that contain fruit as well as those cereals that are puffed,
made from oats, and labeled as natural.
The conceptual model is an extension of the works by Gerstner, Hess, and Holthausen
(1994), Shaffer and Zhang (1995), and Stanley and Tschirhart (1991).  By itself, each piece only
considers a subset of the factors that influence the size of discounts.  Combining the spirit of each
work gives a more complete understanding of the determinants of coupon values.  Using
Gerstner, Hess, and Holthausen (1994) as a starting point, the development of the model begins
with a single, profit-maximizing firm that produces one good.  The manufacturer actually has
several rivals, but interfirm competition is disregarded for the time being.  However, it is
important to know that although the firms produce highly substitutable products, the
manufacturers engage in fierce product differentiation.  As a result, each firm holds a localized
monopoly over its brand, and the demand curves of the individual consumers are downward-
sloping and fairly elastic.
Assume that the consumers in the firm’s market vary in their willingness to pay for the
product.  A person’s willingness to pay is thought to be a function of  his/her preferences.  At one
end of the spectrum, there are consumers who gain much pleasure when they consume the item. 
These individuals value the good highly and have a high reservation price for the product.  These
customers are called Highs, and their reservation price is denoted as P .  Consumers with strong Hpreferences are considered to be brand loyal.  On the other hand, there are individuals who only
weakly prefer the item.  As a result, they are not willing to pay as high a price as those who highly
value the product.  These consumers are nonloyal because they are not attached to the brand and
may be enticed to buy a rival’s competing good.  These individuals are denoted as Lows, and they
have a reservation price equal to P . L
It is assumed that each consumer’s demand curve can be represented by a linear function. 
All Highs have the demand curve Q  = a  - bP.  Similarly, the demand curve for a Low is HH
Q  = a  - bP.  Because the two groups have different reservation prices, the Lows’ demand curves LL
are below that of the Highs (a  < a ).  Each High has a reservation price equal to a /b, and the LH H
nonloyal consumers’ reservation price is a /b.  The slopes of the demand functions are assumed to L
be the same.  The demand curves for individual loyal and nonloyal consumers are shown
graphically in Figure I.  The High and Low’s demand curves are denoted as D  and D , HL
respectively.
Figure I.  Demand Curves for Individual Loyal and Nonloyal Consumers
If the firm charges a retail price, P, greater than P  (or a /b), the quantity purchased by HH
any consumer is zero.  Therefore, setting P > a /b is not the optimal pricing strategy for the firm.  H Linear population density functions are employed to facilitate the derivation of the
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brand’s optimal coupon value from the firm’s profit function below. 
The manufacturer could set P < a /b, but the firm can increase its profit by setting a /b < P < a /b L LH
and price discriminating against the consumers.  When P < a /b, brand loyal individuals buy the H
product, and the quantity demanded increases as P falls (as specified by the High’s demand
curve).  As long as P > a /b, the nonloyal consumers are excluded from the market.  This is true L
because the retail price is greater than their willingness to pay for the brand.  The crucial concept
is that if P > P  and the firm wants some portion of the nonloyal segment to purchase the brand, L
the manufacturer must make the product affordable for the Lows by offering a coupon for the
product.
Whether or not a consumer uses the coupon depends on the individual’s level of
transactions costs, t.  Transactions costs are distributed among the loyal and nonloyal consumers
with a maximum value of T.  A person’s brand loyalty does not imply anything about the level of
transactions costs the consumer may have.  In other words, both loyal and nonloyal consumers
can have either high or low transactions costs.  The population density functions [1]  f(t) = m + nt
and [2]  g(t) = y + zt  characterize the number of loyal and nonloyal consumers at each level of t,
respectively.   To maintain generality, the slopes of the functions, n and z, may be positive,
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negative, or zero.  The slopes may also be different in absolute terms as well as sign.  The total
numbers of loyal and nonloyal consumers are found by integrating the two population density
functions from zero to T.  The numbers of loyal and nonloyal consumers in the firm’s market are
mT + ½nT  and yT + ½zT , respectively.  The total number of people in the market is the sum of
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the values for the two segments: T(m+y) +½T  (n+z).
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into four subgroups: loyal nonusers, loyal users, nonloyal users, and nonloyal nonusers.  That is,
there are brand loyal consumers who use the coupon as well as those who do not redeem it.  In
addition, the coupon gets some of the nonloyal consumers to buy the brand while others continue
not purchase the product.
Because P < a /b, brand loyal consumers always purchase some quantity of the good.  A H
brand loyal consumer does not use the coupon if his/her cost of redeeming the discount, t, is
greater than the coupon’s face value, C.  Each loyal nonuser pays the full price of the product and
purchases the quantity that is associated with P.  The total quantity bought by all of the loyal
nonusers, Q , is found by multiplying the number of loyal nonusers by the amount each individual LN
purchases.
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Loyal consumers redeem the coupon if t ￿ C.  In other words, these individuals use the 
coupon if a positive net savings can be realized.  The ability of the loyal consumers to purchase
the product at the discounted price results in what is called leakage.  Some care must be taken
when determining the price paid and quantity purchased by the loyal coupon users.  With a
coupon, the price paid is lowered from P to P - C.  However, the cost of redeeming the coupon
reduces the savings that is realized by the consumer.  As a result, the price that the individual
faces is actually P - C + t, and the quantity purchased is determined by this subjective price.  The
total amount bought by the loyal coupon users is Q . LC 
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In order to make the product affordable and get the nonloyal consumers to purchase the[] {}
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4
product, the coupon value must be large enough to offset the nonloyal individuals’ transactions
costs and lower the price paid to or below the nonloyal consumers’ reservation price.  In other
words, nonloyal consumers buy some amount of the good only if P - C + t ￿ a /b.  The total L
quantity purchased by the nonloyal coupon users is Q  .   Some nonloyal individuals do not buy NC
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the brand because their transactions costs are so high that the net saving (C - t) does not lower the
price paid to or below a /b. L
Now that the quantities purchased by all of the relevant subgroups have been defined, the
profit function of the firm can be stated as $ = (P-W)Q  + (P-C-W)(Q  + Q ) where W is a LN LC NC
constant cost of production and all other variables are as defined above.  The optimal coupon
value for the brand is found by taking the derivative of the profit function with respect to C,
setting the first order condition equal to zero, and solving for C.  The brand’s optimal coupon
value is a function of its retail price along with the cost of production and the parameters of the
demand curves and population distribution functions.  There is a positive relationship between P
and C because if the firm raises P, the gap between P and P  increases.  If the manufacturer wants L
the nonloyal consumers to remain in the market and purchase the brand, the firm must counteract
the widening gap with a larger discount.
Up until this point, the competition among firms has been ignored.  Shaffer and Zhang’s
(1995) address model is employed to show the effects of brand loyalty and interfirm competition
on brand coupon values.  It is assumed that the single-firm framework described above applies to
several manufacturers that produce competing differentiated brands.  Each individual is assumed
to have at least a weak preference for one brand.  That is, a consumer has a favorite brand, andhis/her preference toward the preferred product can range from being marginal to extremely brand
loyal.  This assumption implies that every individual is located within the market boundary of one
of the firms.  Because coupon usage depends on an individual’s level of transactions costs,
manufacturers have both loyal and nonloyal coupon-using consumers in their markets.
It is assumed that the firms are noncooperative with respect to product promotion and
couponing.  Manufacturers encourage the consumers of rival companies to switch products by
offering discounts for their own brands.  The size of the discounts required to entice brand
switching depends on the average level of loyalty of the targeted consumers.  Small (high)
discounts are needed if the lower bound of the consumers’ loyalty is relatively low (high).  This
competitive environment forces the targeted firms to react defensively and issue coupons to
protect their products’ market shares.  The level of defensive couponing is positively related to
the amount of offensive targeting done by the rivals.  In addition, firms try not to discount their
brands for their own loyal consumers because those individuals are willing to pay the products’
full retail prices.  In other words, manufacturers attempt to minimize the amount of leakage. 
Therefore, there is an inverse relationship between a coupon’s face value and level of consumers’
brand loyalty to the discounted product.
There are additional factors that influence coupon values.  Connor (1998) stated that RTE
cereal manufacturers issue coupons to increase brand market share.  This statement implies that
companies maintain their brands’ large market positions with high-valued coupons.  As a result,
there is a positive relationship between a brand’s market share and its coupon value.  In addition,
the size of the discounts is expected to vary by product type.  Since this study focuses on RTE
cereals, four categories of cereal are defined: regular/adult, presweetened, fruit/nut, and granolas. 
If regular cereals are considered to be the base, it is thought that presweetened cereals arediscounted less than adult cereals because parents are more willing to give in to their children’s
preferences.  Parents need more of an incentive to purchase brands for themselves (usually regular
cereals).  Granolas and those cereals that contain fruit or nuts appeal to certain individuals and can
be thought of as specialized brands.  For these types of cereal, consumer preferences are strong
and average brand loyalty is high.  Therefore, in order to encourage brand switching within these
product segments, manufacturers must offer larger discounts as compared with those for regular
cereals.  In addition, coupon values are influenced by the size of the issuing manufacturer.  Large
firms are expected to offer greater discounts as compared with those issued by small, private
label, and generic firms.  These manufacturers have large revenues and can afford to spend more
on promotional campaigns.  This study denotes General Mills (GM) as the reference point.  Other
firms identified in this study are Kellogg, Post, Ralston, Quaker, Nabisco, Malt-O-Meal, Sunshine,
Kashi, McKee, Health Valley, generic, and private label firms  (the last two are aggregated over
all manufacturers and brands).
The model is tailored to the RTE breakfast cereal industry because this market exhibits the
important characteristics of the theoretical framework.  Cereal manufacturers produce highly, but
not perfectly, substitutable products.  Fierce horizontal product differentiation gives each firm
localized monopolies over its brands.  While cereal manufacturers are anticompetitive with respect
to brand pricing, they remain competitive in terms of product promotion.  The industry’s
noncooperative couponing behavior allows for the application of Shaffer and Zhang’s (1995)
competitive couponing framework.
The following equation is specified to characterize the determinants of brand coupon
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where RBCV is the average redeemed coupon value for a given brand in dollars.  Using redeemed
coupon values is more appropriate than coupon values that are offered.  In order for firms to
realize their price discriminatory and competitive goals, coupons must be redeemed.  Discounts
that are issued but never used are wasteful from the firm’s perspective.  BRP signifies the retail
brand price in dollars per pound, BL is an index that represents the brand loyalty of coupon users
and is calculated by Information Resources, Inc. (IRI), BMS is the percentage market share held
by a brand in the entire RTE breakfast cereal market, and RR represents rival coupon redemptions
(a proxy for the level of competitive couponing among rival firms).  The variable RR is defined to
be the total dollar value of all coupons redeemed for cereals not produced by the targeted firm.  It
is designed to capture the intensity of the incentive to switch from a given brand to competing
cereals.  The terms F and BT are 0/1 dummy variables and denote the firms and cereal types,
respectively.  A linear-additive functional form is chosen because the true functional form is not
known.
Annual brand-level scanner data on RTE cereals are collected from the Marketing Fact
Book (1992 to 1995 editions) which is published annually by IRI.  The RTE cereals included in
the Marketing Fact Book are those that attained at least 0.5 percent market share among the
households purchasing cereals during the reporting period (January 1 to December 31).  The data
source does have some limitations in that it does not include sales through non-grocery outlets,
products without UPC codes, and non-scannable items.  The sample consists 97 brands which
were consistently available during the period.  Cereals that were introduced or discontinued
during the time frame are not included.  The exclusion of these brands is not thought to pose aproblem because the total market share of these products is small relative to that of the
established brands.  A fixed effects panel data model is employed because it utilizes the cross-
sectional and time series aspects of the data.  The model is estimated using ordinary least squares,
and the results are given in Table I.
Table I.  OLS Estimates Explaining Redeemed Coupon Values
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
Brand Retail Price 0.1354 11.66
*
Brand Loyalty -0.0008 -0.1726
Brand Market Share 0.0253 2.860
*
Rival Redemptions 0.0119 6.534
*
Firm:  Quaker -0.2526 -9.277
*
           Kellogg -0.1669 -9.635
*
           Post -0.1174 -4.690
*
           Nabisco -0.1512 -4.350
*
           Sunshine -0.4975 -7.683
*
           Generic -0.3725 -5.407
*
           Health Valley -0.6926 -10.83
*
           Kashi -0.6803 -10.66
*
           Malt-O-Meal -0.4032 -9.555
*
           McKee -0.4085 -6.124
*
           Private Label -0.5738 -7.756
*
           Ralston -0.1358 -4.652
*
Type: Presweetened -0.0036 -0.2369
           Fruit/Nut 0.0255 1.510
†




R  = 0.6876 n = 97 observations
2
 Significant at the 0.005 confidence level.
*
 Significant at the 0.1 confidence level.
†
The model does a respectable job in explaining the variation in average redeemed brand
coupon values.  The measure of fit, R , shows that approximately 68 percent of the variation in
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average redeemed brand coupon values is explained by the 19 independent variables.  Note that allof the coefficients are in dollars.  The signs of coefficients associated with the retail price, brand
market share, and target couponing variables are consistent with expectations and are statistically
significant.  While average redeemed coupon values fall with higher levels of brand loyalty, the
coefficient is statistically insignificant.  This result is contrary to a priori expectations.  There are
two possible reasons for why the loyalty variable is insignificant.  First, high cereal prices may
have eroded brand loyalty.  By the time the data series started in 1992, brand loyalty may have
already been low.  Second, IRI is not clear as to how it calculates the brand loyalty index. 
Therefore, it is possible that the data are unreliable.  
Each firm indicator variable denotes the difference between the respective firm’s average
redeemed brand coupon value and that of GM.  It is clear that GM offers the highest average
redeemed coupon value since all of the firm indicator coefficients are negative and, in most cases,
statistically significant.  The cereal type indicator variables reveal that presweetened cereals
require less discounting than regular/adult cereals, but the difference is insignificant.  Fruit/nut and
granola brands have higher effective coupon discounts than regular cereals.  Both of the
coefficients are statistically significant.
This study confirms the price discriminatory function of coupons.  However, cereal
manufacturers are competitive with respect to couponing.  Apparently, firms fight hard to get
consumers to switch from competing brands.  If actions are taken to make the breakfast cereal
industry more price competitive, the measures should be chosen such that they do not affect the
competitiveness of the industry’s couponing behavior.  Further study may include the use of
different product categories, trying to explain the relatively large size of redeemed brand coupon
values for generic cereals, and testing the robustness of the model by applying it to another
industry that has less brand differentiation and/or fewer product segments.References
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